Lattice-Based Zero-Knowledge Proofs (II)

Ngoc Khanh Nguyen

So far…



<u>Approximate [Lyu09,Lyu12]</u>:

- We only prove that we know short $\boldsymbol{s}$ and short c such that $\boldsymbol{As = cu}$.
- This is enough for identification schemes and signatures like CRYSTALS-Dilithium.
- Small proof sizes ($\approx 3KB$).

But we wanted more!



Exact:

- We prove exactly that $\boldsymbol{s}$ is within specified range and $\boldsymbol{As = u}\ (mod\ q)$.
- This is crucial for building more advanced privacy-preserving primitives, e.g. verifiable encryption.
- Much bigger proof sizes.

The main focus of this talk:

$$\boldsymbol{As} = \boldsymbol{u}\ (mod\ q) \text{ and } \mathbf{s} \in \{0,1\}^m$$

Later on:

- ❑ Quiz
- ❑ Applications
- ❑ Obtaining succinct proofs

Equation over ring $\mathbb{Z}_q$

Overview

$$\boldsymbol{As} = \boldsymbol{u} \pmod{q}$$

$$\boldsymbol{s} \in \{0,1\}^m$$

Lemma: Let $\boldsymbol{s} \in \mathbb{Z}^{\boldsymbol{m}}$. Then, $\boldsymbol{s} \in \{0,1\}^m$ if and only if $\langle \boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{s}-\boldsymbol{1} \rangle = 0$.

Proof: Suppose $\langle \boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{s}-\boldsymbol{1} \rangle = 0$. This means that

$$\sum_{i=1}^{m} s_i(s_i - 1) = 0\,.$$

However, since each s_i is an integer, we have

$$s_i(s_i - 1) \geq 0$$

Hence, the sum is equal to zero if each of the inequalities is an equality, i.e. $s_i \in \{0,1\}$.

Overview

$$\boldsymbol{As} = \boldsymbol{u} \pmod{q}$$

$$\langle \boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{s} - \boldsymbol{1} \rangle = 0.$$



$$\langle \boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{s} - \boldsymbol{1} \rangle = 0 \ (mod\ q)$$

and

$$||\boldsymbol{s}|| \ll q$$

Overview

$\boldsymbol{As} = \boldsymbol{u} \pmod q$



$\langle \boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{s} - \boldsymbol{1} \rangle = 0 \ (mod\ q)$



$||\boldsymbol{s}|| \ll q$



Overview

- If I take a random short vector $\boldsymbol{b}$, then clearly

$$\langle \boldsymbol{b}, \boldsymbol{s} \rangle$$

is short.

- But if I am given a large vector $\boldsymbol{s}$, then what's the probability that

$$\langle \boldsymbol{b}, \boldsymbol{s} \rangle$$

is short?

$$||\boldsymbol{s}|| \ll q$$



Overview + ZK

- If I take a random short vector $\boldsymbol{b}$, add a short mask y then clearly

$$y + \langle \boldsymbol{b}, \boldsymbol{s} \rangle$$

is short.

- But if I am given a large vector $\boldsymbol{s}$ and y, then what's the probability that

$$y + \langle \boldsymbol{b}, \boldsymbol{s} \rangle$$

is short?

$||\boldsymbol{s}|| \ll q$



Approximate range proof lemma

$||\boldsymbol{s}|| \ll q$

Lemma:

$$\Pr_{\boldsymbol{b} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^m}[|\langle \boldsymbol{b}, \boldsymbol{s} \rangle + y| < \frac{1}{2} \cdot ||\boldsymbol{s}||] \leq 1/2.$$

Proof: Let $s_i = ||\boldsymbol{s}||$ for some i.
Then, we can write $\langle \boldsymbol{b}, \boldsymbol{s} \rangle + y = b_i s_i + r$.

By the triangle inequality, at least one of $\{r, s_i + r\}$ has to have norm at least $\frac{1}{2} \cdot ||\boldsymbol{s}||$.

The probability of hitting that value is at least ½.



Overview

Lemma:

$$\Pr_{\boldsymbol{B}\leftarrow\{0,1\}^{\lambda\times m}}[||\boldsymbol{Bs}+\boldsymbol{y}|| < \frac{1}{2}\cdot||\boldsymbol{s}||] \leq 1/2^{\lambda}.$$

Proof: By amplification.

$||\boldsymbol{s}|| \ll q$



Intuition

$||\boldsymbol{s}|| \ll q$

$\boldsymbol{s} \in \{0,1\}^m$

$\boldsymbol{y} \leftarrow [-\alpha, \alpha]^\lambda$



Hence, the verifier is convinced that $||\boldsymbol{s}|| \leq 2||\boldsymbol{y} + \boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{s}|| \leq 2(\alpha - m)$ (with high probability).

$\boldsymbol{B} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\lambda \times m}$

$\boldsymbol{z} = \boldsymbol{y} + \boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{s}$

If $||\boldsymbol{z}|| > \alpha - m$, reject

Check $||\boldsymbol{z}|| \leq \alpha - m$

$\boldsymbol{z} = \boldsymbol{y} + \boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{s}$

Commitments

Message m

$t = Com(m; r)$

Binding:
It's hard to find two different openings (m, r) and (m', r') such that $Com(m; r) = Com(m'; r')$.

Hiding:
The adversary can't learn any information about (m, r) from t

Attempt 2

$||\boldsymbol{s}|| \ll q$

$\boldsymbol{s} \in \{0,1\}^m$



$\boldsymbol{y} \leftarrow [-\alpha, \alpha]^\lambda$

$\boldsymbol{r} \leftarrow \chi$

$\boldsymbol{t_y} := Com(\boldsymbol{y}; \boldsymbol{r}), \boldsymbol{t_s} := Com(\boldsymbol{s}; \boldsymbol{r})$

$\boldsymbol{B} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\lambda \times m}$

$\boldsymbol{B}$

$\boldsymbol{z} = \boldsymbol{y} + \boldsymbol{Bs}$

If $||\boldsymbol{z}|| > \alpha - m$, reject

$\boldsymbol{z}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{r}$

Check $||\boldsymbol{z}|| \leq \alpha - m$

$\boldsymbol{z} = \boldsymbol{y} + \boldsymbol{Bs}$

$\boldsymbol{t_y} = Com(\boldsymbol{y}; \boldsymbol{r}), \boldsymbol{t_s} = Com(\boldsymbol{s}; \boldsymbol{r})$

Attempt 2

$||\boldsymbol{s}|| \ll q$

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

Instead of sending the openings, we prove Knowledge of them

$\boldsymbol{y} \leftarrow [-\alpha, \alpha]^\lambda$

$\boldsymbol{r} \leftarrow \chi$

$\boldsymbol{t_y} := Com(\boldsymbol{y}; \boldsymbol{r}), \boldsymbol{t}$

$\boldsymbol{B}$

$\boldsymbol{z}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{r}$

$\boldsymbol{B} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\lambda \times m}$

$\boldsymbol{z} = \boldsymbol{y} + \boldsymbol{Bs}$

If $||\boldsymbol{z}|| > \alpha - m$, reject

Check $||\boldsymbol{z}|| \leq \alpha - m$

$\boldsymbol{z} = \boldsymbol{y} + \boldsymbol{Bs}$

$\boldsymbol{t_y} = Com(\boldsymbol{y}; \boldsymbol{r}), \boldsymbol{t_s} = Com(\boldsymbol{s}; \boldsymbol{r})$

Approximate range proof

$\boldsymbol{s} \in \{0,1\}^m$

$||\boldsymbol{s}|| \ll q$

$\boldsymbol{y} \leftarrow [-\alpha, \alpha]^\lambda$

$\boldsymbol{r} \leftarrow \chi$

$\boldsymbol{t_y} \coloneqq Com(\boldsymbol{y}; \boldsymbol{r}), \boldsymbol{t_s} \coloneqq Com(\boldsymbol{s}; \boldsymbol{r})$

$\boldsymbol{B}$

$\boldsymbol{z}$

$\boldsymbol{B} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\lambda \times m}$

$\boldsymbol{z} = \boldsymbol{y} + \boldsymbol{Bs}$

If $||\boldsymbol{z}|| > \alpha - m$, reject

Check $||\boldsymbol{z}|| \leq \alpha - m$

Prove knowledge of $\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{r}$ s.t.

$\boldsymbol{t_y} = Com(\boldsymbol{y}; \boldsymbol{r})$

$\boldsymbol{t_s} = Com(\boldsymbol{s}; \boldsymbol{r})$

$\boldsymbol{z} = \boldsymbol{y} + \boldsymbol{Bs}$

Overview

$$\boldsymbol{As} = \boldsymbol{u} \ (\mathrm{mod}\ \mathrm{q})$$

Linear proof

$$\langle \boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{s} - \boldsymbol{1} \rangle = 0 \ (mod\ q)$$

Inner product proof



$$t_y = Com(y; r)$$
$$t_s = Com(s; r)$$

$$z = y + Bs$$

Linear proof

Overview

$$\boldsymbol{As} = \boldsymbol{u} \pmod q$$

Inner product proof

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Inner product proof



$$t_y = Com(y;r)$$
$$t_s = Com(s;r)$$

$$z = y + Bs$$

Inner product proof

Next step: inner products over $\mathbb{Z}_q$

- We want to prove inner products (either between two committed messages, or between one secret and one public vector)

- Working natively over integers will result with bad soundness error (see previous lecture)

- We need to translate the inner products into relations over the polynomial ring R_q

Setup

- Consider the standard polynomial ring $R_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^d + 1)$ where d is a power-of-two.

- For $i \in \mathbb{Z}_{2d}^{\times}$, let us denote $\sigma_i : R_q \mapsto R_q$ to be the automorphism defined by $\sigma_i(X) = X^i$.

- Let $\sigma := \sigma_{-1}$. Seems irrelevant now but it will be useful later!

- For $x \in R_q$, we denote $ct(x) = x_0$ its constant coefficient/term.

The key ingredient

Lemma: Let $\mathrm{u} \coloneqq \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} u_i X^i$ and $\mathrm{v} \coloneqq \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} v_i X^i$ be ring elements in R_q. Then, the constant coefficient of the polynomial $u\sigma_{-1}(v) \in R_q$ is $\sum_{i=0}^{d-1} u_i v_i$.

Proof: By definition,

$$u\sigma_{-1}(v) = (\sum_{i=0}^{d-1} u_i X^i)\sigma\left(\sum_{i=0}^{d-1} v_i X^i\right) = (\sum_{i=0}^{d-1} u_i X^i)\left(\sum_{i=0}^{d-1} v_i X^{-i}\right) = \sum_{i,j} u_i v_j X^{i-j}\,.$$

Therefore, the constant term is indeed $u_0 v_0 + u_1 v_1 + \cdots + u_{d-1} v_{d-1}$.

The key ingredient

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As an application of this lemma, we know a vector $\boldsymbol{s} \in \mathbb{Z}^d$ satisfies $\langle \boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{s} - \mathbf{1} \rangle = 0 \ (mod\ q)$ **if and only if**

$$ct\left(\left(s - \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} X^i\right) \cdot \sigma(s)\right) = 0$$

where $\mathrm{s} \coloneqq \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} s_i X^i$.

The key ingredient

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As an application of this lemma, we know a vector $\boldsymbol{s} = (\boldsymbol{s_1}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{s_{m/d}}) \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ satisfies $\langle \boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{s} - \boldsymbol{1} \rangle = 0 \ (mod\ q)$ **if and only if**

$$ct\left(\sum_{j=1}^{m/d}\left(s_j - \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} X^i\right) \cdot \sigma(s_j)\right) = 0$$

where $\mathrm{s_j} \coloneqq \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} s_{j \cdot d+i} X^i$.

Back to overview

$$\boldsymbol{As} = \boldsymbol{u} \ (\mathrm{mod\ q})$$

$$\forall i, ct(f_i(\boldsymbol{s})) = 0$$

$$\langle \boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{s-1} \rangle = 0 \ (mod\ q)$$

$$ct\left(\sum_{j=1}^{m/d}\left(s_j - \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} X^i\right)\cdot \sigma(s_j)\right) = 0$$



$$\boldsymbol{t_y} = Com(\boldsymbol{y}; \boldsymbol{r})$$
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$$\boldsymbol{z} = \boldsymbol{y} + \boldsymbol{Bs}$$

$$\boldsymbol{t_y} = Com(\boldsymbol{y}; \boldsymbol{r})$$
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$$\forall i, ct(g_i(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y})) = 0$$

So far so good

$$\boldsymbol{As} = \boldsymbol{u} \pmod q$$

$$\forall i, ct(f_i(\boldsymbol{s})) = 0$$

$$\langle \boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{s}-\boldsymbol{1} \rangle = 0 \ (mod\ q)$$

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

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$$\forall i, ct(f_i(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y})) = 0$$

where f_i are public quadratic functions (with σ)

Proving constant coefficients

- We want to prove that $\forall i, ct(f_{\boldsymbol{i}}(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y})) = 0$

- Clearly, for any $\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_k \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ we have

$$ct\left(\sum_{i=1}^{k} \mu_i \cdot f_{\boldsymbol{i}}(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y})\right) = \sum_{i=1}^{k} \mu_i \cdot ct(f_{\boldsymbol{i}}(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y})) \; = 0\,.$$

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But what happens if for some $i, ct(f_{\boldsymbol{i}}(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y})) \; \neq 0$?

Then, with prob. $\frac{1}{q}$, we have $ct\left(\sum_{i=1}^{k} \mu_i \cdot f_{\boldsymbol{i}}(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y})\right) = 0$. Repeat L times.

Adding zero-knowledge

- $\sum_{i=1}^{k} \mu_i \cdot f_{\boldsymbol{i}}(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y})$ potentially leaks information about $\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y}$

Adding zero-knowledge

- $\sum_{i=1}^{k} \mu_i \cdot f_{\boldsymbol{i}}(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y})$ potentially leaks information about $\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y}$

- Sample and commit to random polynomials $g_1, \dots, g_L \leftarrow \{x \in R_q : ct(x) = 0\}$.
- Given challenges $\mu_{j,1}, \dots, \mu_{j,k}$ for $j = 1, \dots, L$, compute

$$h_j := g_j + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \mu_{j,i} \cdot f_{\boldsymbol{i}}(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y})$$

Hence, $ct(h_j) = 0$ and h_j hides info about other coeffs of $\sum_{i=1}^{k} \mu_{j,i} \cdot f_{\boldsymbol{i}}(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y})$

$$\boldsymbol{t_y} = Com(\boldsymbol{y}; \boldsymbol{r})$$
$$\boldsymbol{t_s} = Com(\boldsymbol{s}; \boldsymbol{r})$$
$$\forall i, ct(f_{\boldsymbol{i}}(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y})) = 0$$

$\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y}$



$g_1, \ldots, g_L \leftarrow \{x \in R_q : ct(x) = 0\}$

$\boldsymbol{t_g} := Com(\boldsymbol{g}; \boldsymbol{r})$ →

← $(\mu_{j,i})_{j,i}$

$(\mu_{j,i})_{j,i} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{L \times k}$

$\forall j, h_j := g_j + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \mu_{j,i} \cdot f_{\boldsymbol{i}}(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y})$

$h_1, \ldots, h_L$ →

Check $\forall j, ct(h_j) = 0$

Overview

$\boldsymbol{As} = \boldsymbol{u} \pmod q$

$\forall i, ct(f_i(\boldsymbol{s})) = 0$

$\langle \boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{s} - \boldsymbol{1} \rangle = 0 \ (mod\ q)$

$$ct\left(\sum_{j=1}^{m/d}\left(s_j - \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} X^i\right)\cdot\sigma(s_j)\right) = 0$$



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$t_y = Com(\boldsymbol{y}; \boldsymbol{r})$
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where f_i are public quadratic functions (with σ)

$t_y = Com(\boldsymbol{y}; \boldsymbol{r})$
$t_s = Com(\boldsymbol{s}; \boldsymbol{r})$

$t_g := Com(\boldsymbol{g}; \boldsymbol{r})$

$$\forall j, h_j = g_j + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \mu_{j,i} \cdot f_i(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y})$$

In other words

$\boldsymbol{As} = \boldsymbol{u} \pmod q$

$\forall i, ct(f_i(\boldsymbol{s})) = 0$

$\langle \boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{s} - \boldsymbol{1} \rangle = 0 \ (mod\ q)$

$$ct\left(\sum_{j=1}^{m/d}\left(s_j - \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} X^i\right)\cdot\sigma(s_j)\right) = 0$$

Approximate range proof



$\boldsymbol{t_y} = Com(\boldsymbol{y};\boldsymbol{r})$
$\boldsymbol{t_s} = Com(\boldsymbol{s};\boldsymbol{r})$
$\boldsymbol{z} = \boldsymbol{y} + \boldsymbol{Bs}$

$\boldsymbol{t_y} = Com(\boldsymbol{y};\boldsymbol{r})$
$\boldsymbol{t_s} = Com(\boldsymbol{s};\boldsymbol{r})$
$\forall i, ct(g_i(\boldsymbol{s},\boldsymbol{y})) = 0$

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where f_i are public quadratic functions (with σ)

$\boldsymbol{t_y} = Com(\boldsymbol{y};\boldsymbol{r})$
$\boldsymbol{t_s} = Com(\boldsymbol{s};\boldsymbol{r})$

$\boldsymbol{t_g} \coloneqq Com(\boldsymbol{g};\boldsymbol{r})$

$\forall j, P_j(\boldsymbol{s},\boldsymbol{y},\boldsymbol{g}) = 0$

Public quadratic function (with σ)

Simple exercise

- *Discuss with your neighbour (2 minutes):*

How to reduce proving multiple proving multiple quadratic equations $\forall j, P_j(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{g}) = 0$ **into one** $P(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{g}) = 0$?

Simple amortisation

$\boldsymbol{t_y} = Com(\boldsymbol{y}; \boldsymbol{r})$
$\boldsymbol{t_s} = Com(\boldsymbol{s}; \boldsymbol{r})$ $\quad \forall j, P_j(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{g}) = 0$
$\boldsymbol{t_g} := Com(\boldsymbol{g}; \boldsymbol{r})$

$\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y}$



$\eta_1, \ldots, \eta_L$ ←

$\eta_i \leftarrow R_q^L$

Prove that:

$$\sum_{j=1}^{L} \eta_j \cdot P_j(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{g}) = 0$$

Soundness analysis

- What's the probability that $\sum_{j=1}^{L} \eta_j \cdot P_j(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{g}) = 0$ if for some j, $P_j(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{g}) \neq 0$?

- Consider the standard polynomial ring $R_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^d + 1)$ where d is a power-of-two and $q = 5 \ (mod\ 8)$.

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- Consider the standard polynomial ring $R_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^d + 1)$ where d is a power-of-two and $q = 5 \ (mod\ 8).$

- Then, $X^d + 1 = \left(X^{\frac{d}{2}} - r\right)\left(X^{\frac{d}{2}} + r\right)$ factors into two irreducible polynomials modulo q.

- By CRT, R_q is isomorphic to $\frac{\mathbb{Z}[X]}{\left(X^{\frac{d}{2}} - r, q\right)} \times \frac{\mathbb{Z}[X]}{\left(X^{\frac{d}{2}} - r, q\right)}$.

Soundness analysis

- What's the probability that $\sum_{j=1}^{L} \eta_j \cdot P_j(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{g}) = 0$ if for some j, $P_j(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{g}) \neq 0$?
- Consider the standard polynomial ring $R_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^d + 1)$ where d is a power-of-two and $q = 5 \ (mod\ 8)$.
- Then, $X^d + 1 = \left(X^{\frac{d}{2}} - r\right)\left(X^{\frac{d}{2}} + r\right)$ factors into two irreducible polynomials modulo q.
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- Hence the probability that $\eta_j \cdot P_j(\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{g}) = x$ is at most $q^{-d/2}$.



$t_y = Com(y;r)$
$t_s = Com(s;r)$

$t_g := Com(g;r)$

$Q(s,y,g) = 0$

I can only do handwaving thus far



ABDLOP commitment (= [Ajt96] + [BDLOP18])

- Suppose we want to commit to a polynomial vector $(\boldsymbol{s_1}, \boldsymbol{m}) \in R_q^{m_1+l}$ where $\boldsymbol{s_1}$ has small norm (but not necessarily $\boldsymbol{m}$).

We could treat $\boldsymbol{s_1} \coloneqq \boldsymbol{s}$ and $\boldsymbol{m} \coloneqq (\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{g})$.

ABDLOP commitment (= [Ajt96] + [BDLOP18])

- Suppose we want to commit to a polynomial vector $(\boldsymbol{s_1}, \boldsymbol{m}) \in R_q^{m_1+l}$ where $\boldsymbol{s_1}$ has small norm (but not necessarily $\boldsymbol{m}$).

- The ABDLOP commitment under randomness $\boldsymbol{s}_2 \in R_q^{m_2}$ is defined as:

$$\begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{t}_A \\ \boldsymbol{t}_B \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{A}_1 \\ \boldsymbol{0} \end{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{s_1} + \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{A}_2 \\ \boldsymbol{B} \end{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{s_2} + \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{0} \\ \boldsymbol{m} \end{bmatrix}.$$

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If $l = 0$ then ABDLOP = Ajtai commitment.

If $m_1 = 0$ then ABDLOP = BDLOP commitment.

ABDLOP commitment (= [Ajt96] + [BDLOP18])

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Security:

Breaking binding implies finding a MSIS solution to $[\boldsymbol{A}_1 \;\; \boldsymbol{A}_2]$.

ABDLOP commitment (= [Ajt96] + [BDLOP18])

- Suppose we want to commit to a polynomial vector $(\boldsymbol{s_1}, \boldsymbol{m}) \in R_q^{m_1+l}$ where $\boldsymbol{s_1}$ has small norm (but not necessarily $\boldsymbol{m}$).

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Security:

Hiding follows from MLWE since $\begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{A}_2 \\ \boldsymbol{B} \end{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{s_2}$ looks uniformly random (for long enough randomness)

ABDLOP opening proof

$$\begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{t}_A \\ \boldsymbol{t}_B \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{A}_1 \\ \boldsymbol{0} \end{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{s_1} + \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{A}_2 \\ \boldsymbol{B} \end{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{s_2} + \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{0} \\ \boldsymbol{m} \end{bmatrix}$$ and $\boldsymbol{s}_1, \boldsymbol{s}_2$ have small coefficients

$(\boldsymbol{A}_1, \boldsymbol{A}_2, \boldsymbol{B}, \boldsymbol{t}_A, \boldsymbol{t_B}), (\boldsymbol{s}_1, \boldsymbol{s}_2, \boldsymbol{m})$



$(\boldsymbol{A}_1, \boldsymbol{A}_2, \boldsymbol{B}, \boldsymbol{t}_A, \boldsymbol{t_B})$

ABDLOP opening proof

$$\begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{t}_A \\ \boldsymbol{t}_B \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{A}_1 \\ \boldsymbol{0} \end{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_1 + \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{A}_2 \\ \boldsymbol{B} \end{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_2 + \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{0} \\ \boldsymbol{m} \end{bmatrix}$$ and $\boldsymbol{s}_1, \boldsymbol{s}_2$ have small coefficients

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

$(\boldsymbol{A}_1, \boldsymbol{A}_2, \boldsymbol{B}, \boldsymbol{t}_A, \boldsymbol{t}_B)$

$\boldsymbol{y}_i \leftarrow D^{m_i}$

$\boldsymbol{w} = \boldsymbol{A}_1 \boldsymbol{y}_1 + \boldsymbol{A}_2 \boldsymbol{y}_2$

$\boldsymbol{w}$ →

$c \leftarrow \boldsymbol{\mathcal{C}}$

← c

$\boldsymbol{z}_i = \boldsymbol{y}_i + c\boldsymbol{s}_i$

$\boldsymbol{z}_1, \boldsymbol{z}_2$ →

Check: i) $\boldsymbol{z}_1, \boldsymbol{z}_2$ are small

ii) $\boldsymbol{A}_1 \boldsymbol{z}_1 + \boldsymbol{A}_2 \boldsymbol{z}_2 = \boldsymbol{w} + c\boldsymbol{t}_A$

Quadratic equations

$$\begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{t}_A \\ \boldsymbol{t}_B \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{A}_1 \\ \boldsymbol{0} \end{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_1 + \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{A}_2 \\ \boldsymbol{B} \end{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_2 + \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{0} \\ \boldsymbol{m} \end{bmatrix}$$

- Suppose we want to prove $\boldsymbol{s}_1^T \boldsymbol{s}_1 + \boldsymbol{m}^T \boldsymbol{m} = \boldsymbol{0}$.

Quadratic equations

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ABDLOP opening proof



Quadratic equations

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- Suppose we want to prove $\boldsymbol{s}_1^T \boldsymbol{s}_1 + \boldsymbol{m}^T \boldsymbol{m} = \boldsymbol{0}$.

Note that the verifier can compute

$$\boldsymbol{z}_1^T \boldsymbol{z}_1 = \boldsymbol{y}_1^T \boldsymbol{y}_1 + 2c\boldsymbol{y}_1^T \boldsymbol{s}_1 + c^2 \boldsymbol{s}_1^T \boldsymbol{s}_1$$

ABDLOP opening proof



Quadratic equations

$$\begin{bmatrix} t_A \\ t_B \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} A_1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} s_1 + \begin{bmatrix} A_2 \\ B \end{bmatrix} s_2 + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ m \end{bmatrix}$$

- Suppose we want to prove $s_1^T s_1 + m^T m = 0$.

Note that the verifier can compute

$$z_1^T z_1 = y_1^T y_1 + 2c y_1^T s_1 + c^2 s_1^T s_1$$

Moreover, we know $t_B - B z_2 = -B y_2 + cm$.

Thus:

$$(t_B - B z_2)^T (t_B - B z_2)$$
$$= (B y_2)^T B y_2 - 2c(B y_2)^T m + c^2 m^T m$$

ABDLOP opening proof



Quadratic equations

$$\begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{t}_A \\ \boldsymbol{t}_B \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{A}_1 \\ \boldsymbol{0} \end{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_1 + \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{A}_2 \\ \boldsymbol{B} \end{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_2 + \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{0} \\ \boldsymbol{m} \end{bmatrix}$$

- Suppose we want to prove $\boldsymbol{s}_1^T \boldsymbol{s}_1 + \boldsymbol{m}^T \boldsymbol{m} = \boldsymbol{0}$.

Then,

$$\boldsymbol{z}_1^T \boldsymbol{z}_1 + (\boldsymbol{t}_B - \boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{z}_2)^T (\boldsymbol{t}_B - \boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{z}_2)$$
$$= g_0 + c g_1 + c^2 (\boldsymbol{s}_1^T \boldsymbol{s}_1 + \boldsymbol{m}^T \boldsymbol{m})$$

where

$$g_0 = \boldsymbol{y}_1^T \boldsymbol{y}_1 + (\boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{y}_2)^T \boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{y}_2$$
$$g_1 = 2\boldsymbol{y}_1^T \boldsymbol{s}_1 - 2(\boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{y}_2)^T \boldsymbol{m}.$$

ABDLOP opening proof



Quadratic equations

$$\begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{t}_A \\ \boldsymbol{t}_B \\ t_1 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{A}_1 \\ \boldsymbol{0} \\ \boldsymbol{0} \end{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_1 + \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{A}_2 \\ \boldsymbol{B} \\ \boldsymbol{b}_1^T \end{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_2 + \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{0} \\ \boldsymbol{m} \\ g_1 \end{bmatrix}$$

- Suppose we want to prove $\boldsymbol{s}_1^T \boldsymbol{s}_1 + \boldsymbol{m}^T \boldsymbol{m} = \boldsymbol{0}$.

ABDLOP opening proof



Then,

$$\boldsymbol{z}_1^T \boldsymbol{z}_1 + (\boldsymbol{t}_B - \boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{z}_2)^T (\boldsymbol{t}_B - \boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{z}_2) = g_0 + c g_1 + c^2 (\boldsymbol{s}_1^T \boldsymbol{s}_1 + \boldsymbol{m}^T \boldsymbol{m})$$

where

$$g_0 = \boldsymbol{y}_1^T \boldsymbol{y}_1 + (\boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{y}_2)^T \boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{y}_2$$
$$g_1 = 2\boldsymbol{y}_1^T \boldsymbol{s}_1 - 2(\boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{y}_2)^T \boldsymbol{m}.$$

Hence, commit to $t_1 := \boldsymbol{b}_0^T \boldsymbol{s}_2 + g_1$.

Quadratic equations

$$\begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{t}_A \\ \boldsymbol{t}_B \\ t_1 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{A}_1 \\ \boldsymbol{0} \\ \boldsymbol{0} \end{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_1 + \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{A}_2 \\ \boldsymbol{B} \\ \boldsymbol{b}_1^T \end{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_2 + \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{0} \\ \boldsymbol{m} \\ g_1 \end{bmatrix}$$

- Suppose we $\boldsymbol{m}^T\boldsymbol{m} = \boldsymbol{0}$.

Appending the ABDLOP commitment

Then,

$$\boldsymbol{z}_1^T\boldsymbol{z}_1 + (\boldsymbol{t}_B - \boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{z}_2)^T(\boldsymbol{t}_B - \boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{z}_2)$$
$$= g_0 + cg_1 + c^2(\boldsymbol{s}_1^T\boldsymbol{s}_1 + \boldsymbol{m}^T\boldsymbol{m})$$

where

$$g_0 = \boldsymbol{y}_1^T\boldsymbol{y}_1 + (\boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{y}_2)^T\boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{y}_2$$
$$g_1 = 2\boldsymbol{y}_1^T\boldsymbol{s}_1 - 2(\boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{y}_2)^T\boldsymbol{m}.$$

Hence, commit to $t_1 := \boldsymbol{b}_0^T\boldsymbol{s}_2 + g_1$.

ABDLOP opening proof



Quadratic equations

$$\begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{t}_A \\ \boldsymbol{t}_B \\ t_1 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{A}_1 \\ \boldsymbol{0} \\ \boldsymbol{0} \end{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_1 + \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{A}_2 \\ \boldsymbol{B} \\ \boldsymbol{b}_1^T \end{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_2 + \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{0} \\ \boldsymbol{m} \\ g_1 \end{bmatrix}$$

- Suppose we want to prove $\boldsymbol{s}_1^T \boldsymbol{s}_1 + \boldsymbol{m}^T \boldsymbol{m} = \boldsymbol{0}$.
- $\boldsymbol{z}_1^T \boldsymbol{z}_1 + (\boldsymbol{t}_B - \boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{z}_2)^T (\boldsymbol{t}_B - \boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{z}_2) - (t_1 - \boldsymbol{b}_1^T \boldsymbol{z}_2)$

$$= g_0 + c g_1 - (t_1 - \boldsymbol{b}_1^T \boldsymbol{z}_2)$$

$$= g_0 + \boldsymbol{b}_1^T \boldsymbol{y}_2$$

where the right-hand side does not depend on c.

ABDLOP opening proof



Proving $s_1^T s_1 + m^T m = 0$.

$(A_1, A_2, B, t_A, t_B), (s_1, s_2, m)$

(A_1, A_2, B, t_A, t_B)

$y_i \leftarrow D^{m_i}$

$w = A_1 y_1 + A_2 y_2$

$g_1 = 2y_1^T s_1 - 2(By_2)^T m$

$t_1 := b_1^T s_2 + g_1$

$v := y_1^T y_1 + (By_2)^T By_2 + b_1^T y_2$

w, t_1, v

$c \leftarrow \mathcal{C}$

c

z_1, z_2

$z_i = y_i + c s_i$

Check: - z_1, z_2 are small

- $A_1 z_1 + A_2 z_2 = w + c t_A$

- and:

$z_1^T z_1 + (t_B - Bz_2)^T (t_B - Bz_2) - (t_1 - b_1^T z_2) = v$

Quadratic equations with automorphism

$$\begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{t}_A \\ \boldsymbol{t}_B \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{A}_1 \\ \boldsymbol{0} \end{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_1 + \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{A}_2 \\ \boldsymbol{B} \end{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_2 + \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{0} \\ \boldsymbol{m} \end{bmatrix}$$

- Suppose we want to mix quadratic equations with automorphisms, e.g.

$$\boldsymbol{s}_1^T \sigma(\boldsymbol{s}_1) + \boldsymbol{m}^T \sigma(\boldsymbol{m}) = \boldsymbol{0}.$$

If we assume that each challenge $c \in C$ is stable under the σ automorphism, then one can prove the statement as before!

ABDLOP opening proof



Quadratic equations with automorphism

$$\begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{t}_A \\ \boldsymbol{t}_B \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{A}_1 \\ \boldsymbol{0} \end{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_1 + \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{A}_2 \\ \boldsymbol{B} \end{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_2 + \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{0} \\ \boldsymbol{m} \end{bmatrix}$$

- Suppose we want to mix quadratic equations with automorphisms, e.g.

$$\boldsymbol{s}_1^T \sigma(\boldsymbol{s}_1) + \boldsymbol{m}^T \sigma(\boldsymbol{m}) = \boldsymbol{0}.$$

Then,

$$\boldsymbol{z}_1^T \sigma(\boldsymbol{z}_1) + (\boldsymbol{t}_B - \boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{z}_2)^T \sigma(\boldsymbol{t}_B - \boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{z}_2)$$
$$= g_0 + c g_1 + c^2 (\boldsymbol{s}_1^T \sigma(\boldsymbol{s}_1) + \boldsymbol{m}^T \boldsymbol{\sigma}(\boldsymbol{m}))$$

where

$$g_0 = \boldsymbol{y}_1^T \sigma(\boldsymbol{y}_1) + (\boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{y}_2)^T \sigma(\boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{y}_2)$$
$$g_1 = \boldsymbol{y}_1^T \sigma(\boldsymbol{s}_1) + \sigma(\boldsymbol{y}_1^T)\boldsymbol{s}_1 - \sigma(\boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{y}_2)^T \boldsymbol{m} - (\boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{y}_2)^T \sigma(\boldsymbol{m}).$$

ABDLOP opening proof



Quadratic equations with automorphism

$$\begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{t}_A \\ \boldsymbol{t}_B \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{A}_1 \\ \boldsymbol{0} \end{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_1 + \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{A}_2 \\ \boldsymbol{B} \end{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}_2 + \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{0} \\ \boldsymbol{m} \end{bmatrix}$$

- Suppose we want to mix quadratic equations with automorphisms, e.g.

$$\boldsymbol{s}_1^T \sigma(\boldsymbol{s}_1) + \boldsymbol{m}^T \sigma(\boldsymbol{m})$$

We assumed $\sigma(c) = c$.

Then,

$$\boldsymbol{z}_1^T \sigma(\boldsymbol{z}_1) + (\boldsymbol{t}_B - \boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{z}_2)^T \sigma(\boldsymbol{t}_B - \boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{z}_2)$$
$$= g_0 + c g_1 + c^2 (\boldsymbol{s}_1^T \sigma(\boldsymbol{s}_1) + \boldsymbol{m}^T \boldsymbol{\sigma}(\boldsymbol{m}))$$

where

$$g_0 = \boldsymbol{y}_1^T \sigma(\boldsymbol{y}_1) + (\boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{y}_2)^T \sigma(\boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{y}_2)$$
$$g_1 = \boldsymbol{y}_1^T \sigma(\boldsymbol{s}_1) + \sigma(\boldsymbol{y}_1^T)\boldsymbol{s}_1 - \sigma(\boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{y}_2)^T \boldsymbol{m} - (\boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{y}_2)^T \sigma(\boldsymbol{m}).$$

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

Challenge space

- We need exponentially large challenge space C.
- We want $\sigma(c) = c$ for any $c \in C$.
- We want the difference of any distinct $c, c' \in C$ to be invertible over R_q.

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Let us pick:

$$C = \{c_0 + c_1 X + \cdots + c_{\frac{d}{2}-1} X^{\frac{d}{2}-1} - c_{\frac{d}{2}-1} X^{\frac{d}{2}+1} - \cdots - c_1 X^{d-1} : c_i \in [-\kappa, \kappa]\}.$$

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Lemma: Suppose $q \equiv 5 \ (mod\ 8)$. If $\sigma_{-1}(c) = c$ and c is non-zero, then c is invertible over R_q.

Soundness analysis

- Since the verification equation is a ``quadratic equation'', we actually need to extract three transcripts $(\boldsymbol{w}, c, \boldsymbol{z}), (\boldsymbol{w}, c', \boldsymbol{z}'), (\boldsymbol{w}, c'', \boldsymbol{z}'')$ with pairwise different $c, c', c'' \in C$.

- (Relaxed) Binding from SIS

- Interpolation approach to prove quadratic equations

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- (Relaxed) Binding from SIS

- Interpolation approach to prove quadratic equations

- As before, we extract a candidate witness $\boldsymbol{s}_i := \boldsymbol{s}_i^*/c^*$ (division of two short elements) and $\boldsymbol{m}$, s.t. $\boldsymbol{A}_1\boldsymbol{s}_1 + \boldsymbol{A}_2\boldsymbol{s}_2 = \boldsymbol{t}_A$ and $\boldsymbol{B}\boldsymbol{s}_2 + \boldsymbol{m} = \boldsymbol{t}_B$.

Extraction - meaning

- From the opening proof, we obtain a candidate witness s , it could be large (but relaxed binding holds)

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- Approximate range proof makes sure that $||\boldsymbol{s}|| \ll q$, and we are done.

Which d to pick - tradeoff

- We want d to be large enough, so that the challenge space is exponential-size
- We want d to be as small as possible, since sending ring elements will be costly

Challenge space

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Let us pick:

$$C = \{c_0 + c_1 X + \cdots + c_{\frac{d}{2}-1} X^{\frac{d}{2}-1} - c_{\frac{d}{2}-1} X^{\frac{d}{2}+1} - \cdots - c_1 X^{d-1} : c_i \in [-\kappa, \kappa]\}.$$

$|C| = (2\kappa + 1)^{d/2}$.



Efficiency and applications

Applications

- Proving knowledge of short $\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{e}$ s.t. $\boldsymbol{As} + \boldsymbol{e} = \boldsymbol{u}$.

Scheme	Proof size
Stern proofs (e.g. [Ste93,LNSW13])	3MB
[Beu20]	233KB
[BLS19,YAZ+19]	384KB
Ligero [AHIV17]	157KB
Aurora [BCR+19,BCOS20]	72KB
[ALS20,ENS20]	47KB
[LNS21]	33KB
[LNP22]	14KB

Applications

Constructions	Proof/Signature size
verifiable encryption [L**N**P22]	19KB
integer addition/multiplication [L**N**22]	12/15KB
group signature [L**N**22]	20KB
ring signature [L**N**22]	16KB
blind signature [AKSY22, BL**N**S23]	44KB/26KB

Quiz

- Please skip ``register for credit''
- Put your username if you want to take part in the competition

What about SNARKs?

LaBRADOR [BS23]



Approximate range proof

$s \in \{0,1\}^m$

$||s|| \ll q$

Linear-sized matrix B

$y \leftarrow [-\alpha, \alpha]^\lambda$

$r \leftarrow \chi$

$t_y := Com(y; r), t_s := Com(s; r)$

$B \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\lambda \times m}$

B

$z = y + Bs$

If $||z|| > \alpha - m$, reject

z

Check $||z|| \leq \alpha - m$

Prove knowledge of y, s, r s.t.

$t_y = Com(y; r)$
$t_s = Com(s; r)$

$z = y + Bs$

How to achieve sublinear verification with ARP

- Use a structured tensor-type matrix $\boldsymbol{B}$ [CM**N**W24]
- Use LaBRADOR as a subroutine [**N**S24]
- Just don’t use ARP (and deal with its consequences)

¯_(ツ)_/¯

Summary

- Linear-sized efficient ``exact'' ZKP from lattices
  - Under standard assumptions: MSIS and MLWE
  - Transparent setup
  - Sizes: ≈ 15KB
  - Can be made non-interactive via Fiat-Shamir transformation
- ``Approximate'' proofs more efficient and have some applications

https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/284

Thank you!

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